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GOVERNING THE COMMONS:
The Evolution of Institutions for Collective Action
Elinor Ostrom
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990. Pp. 280.
In 1985, the National Academy of Sciences sponsored a conference in
Annapolis, Maryland, to discuss common property resource management.
This conference was a watershed in the development of the theoretical
underpinning of institutional design for successful common pool resource
(CPR) management. Since then, an international network of over 2,000
researchers has developed, and the International Association for the Study
of Common Property (IASCP), formed in 1989, has held two successful
international conferences. Dominating the intellectual evolution of the
field has been the work of Elinor Ostrom, co-director of the Workshop
in Political Theory and Policy Analysis at Indiana University. Her book,
Governing the Commons, presents a lucid exposition of the current state
of institutional analysis of common property problems. Part of the Cambridge series on Political Economy of Institutions and Decisions, the book
addresses how common pool resources may be managed successfully
without falling prey to the "tragedy of the commons."
Common pool resources are characterized by subtractability (i.e., withdrawal by one user reduces the amount of the resource left for other users)
and joint use by a group of appropriators. Thus, a common village grazing
field has forage for a limited number of beasts, and all the villagers are
entitled to pasture their animals on the field. Community rules of access
and management are required to sustain the field from season to season.
Problems in managing CPRs arise when the rational individual determines
that he will still have access to the resource even if he does not fully
contribute to its maintenance (the "free rider" problem). An extensive
literature discusses the effect of free riders, concluding that common pool
resources will inevitably fall into ruin. One of two solutions is usually
offered to avoid this problem: centralized governmental regulation or
privatization.
Noting the numerous occasions in which common pool resources are
managed successfully with neither centralized governmental control nor
privatization, Ostrom argues for a third approach to resolving the problem
of the commons: the design of durable cooperative institutions that are
organized and governed by the resource users. In Governing the Commons
she examines small-scale common-pool resources. Resource user groups
examined range in size from 50-15,000 people who rely substantially on
the common pool resource for their economic well-being. She has further
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limited the sample by excluding non-renewable resources, resources that
are abundant (rather than scarce), and situations which produce substantial
externalities.
These selection criteria have been chosen for several reasons. First,
the relatively small size of the user groups enables researchers to investigate the existing institutions thoroughly. Second, resource scarcity means
the users will have strong incentives to manage their resources in a
sustainable fashion. And finally, economic dependence guarantees that
any failures of the resource appropriators cannot be attributed to economic
indifference.
Two sets of cases of successful CPR management are examined in
detail: communal tenure in high mountain meadows and forests in Switzerland and Japan, and irrigation systems in Spain and the Philippines.
From these cases, Ostrom identifies eight similar design principles.
The first principle is demarcation of clearly defined boundaries to identify the members of the user pool as well as the physical boundaries of
the CPR. The second, congruence between appropriation and provision
rules and local conditions, requires appropriation rules (regarding the
time, place, acceptable technology, and quantity of CPR allocated) to be
specific to the characteristics of the actual resource; similarly, the rules
governing the contribution required of each appropriator must mirror local
conditions. Third, collective-choice arrangements allow participation by
all affected individuals in deciding on the appropriation and provision
rules.
Fourth, either the appropriators themselves or persons accountable to
the appropriators are responsible for monitoring compliance with collective decisions. Fifth, sanctions should be graduated to reflect the severity,
frequency, and context of the violation. Sixth, low-cost and readily available conflict-resolution mechanisms must exist to mediate conflicts among
appropriators and between appropriators and officials. Seventh, users must
have recognition of their own rights to organize institutions.
Finally, nested enterprises, i.e., sets of rules established within a hierarchy of appropriator institutions, must be established for common-pool
resources that are within larger resource systems and political jurisdictions.
To explore how such principles may have developed, Ostrom uses a
contemporary case, the development of negotiated settlements of water
rights in three southern California water basins. She concludes that institutional change is incremental and sequential, enabling appropriators
to realize the benefits of change before moving on to new institutional
arrangements.
In her final set of case analyses, Ostrom examines unsuccessful common-pool management systems in Turkey, California, Sri Lanka, and
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Nova Scotia. The CPR institutions in these cases do not evidence the
design principles Ostrom isolated from the successful CPR regimes.
The final chapter presents a "framework for analysis of self-organizing
and self-governing CPRs." Ostrom carefully distinguishes the notion of
framework from that of a model.
Models are applicable to specific situations and their variables rest on
assumptions peculiar to the modeled situation. Frameworks, in contrast,
relate models to each other and provide the basis for generating more
specific hypotheses and subsequent theories. Ostrom's framework identifies the complex system of variables, rules, and external constraints that
affect the design of CPR management regimes.
Governingthe Commons is a major theoretical contribution to the study
of collective action and institutional design. It describes in clear language
the problems arising from CPR management and presents an uncompromising critique of existing approaches. Based on empirical evidence gathered from a variety of sources, Ostrom's analytical framework offers
opportunity for extensive theoretical development. It is an inclusive
framework which is not limited to a few disciplines but instead solicits
contributions from the entire range of social sciences. Clearly written,
the book is essential for understanding common-pool resource management institutions.
Susan J. Buck
Department of Political Science
University of North Carolina at Greensboro

